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Abstract
We consider a generic environment with (potentially) multiple equilibria and analyze
conditions that allow for the estimation of both the structural parameters and the
“selected equilibrium”. We focus on a “easy to compute” consistent 2-step estimator
and use Monte Carlo methods to describe its ﬁnite sample properties.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A widespread but undocumented belief among economists is that models with multiple
equilibria do not have empirical content. It is sometimes claimed that using multiple equi-
libria anything can be explained, therefore such models cannot have empirical validation.
The goal of this paper is to challenge this belief by suggesting an estimation procedure
that delivers a consistent estimator of the fundamental parameters and of the “selected”
equilibrium of a generic model with multiple equilibria.
There is a growing literature considering speciﬁc circumstances in which the parameters
of a model with multiple equilibria can be estimated. Our focus, relative to such literature,
is not only on the genericity of the environment we study, but also on the computability of
t h ee s t i m a t i o np r o c e d u r ew ep r o p o s e .
Many economic models display multiple equilibria. Simple Arrow-Debreu endowment
economies even with homothetic preferences can be constructed with any ﬁnite number of
∗Bisin and Topa: New York University; Moro: University of Minnesota
1equilibria (Debreu-Sonnenschein-Mantel theorem). With incomplete markets equilibria are
in some instances indeterminate (that is, a continuum of equilibria exist) see Cass (contribu-
tion for the Econometric Society World Congress). In strategic environments multiple equi-
libria are the norm. Suﬃcient conditions for uniqueness in economies with externalities are
very demanding (Glaeser-Scheinkman, 2001). Other applications arise in Macroeconomics
(Cooper, 1999), Industrial Organization and in search models. We propose a framework
that is generic enough to encompass most of these examples.
In principle, models with multiple equilibria can always be reduced to models with a
unique equilibrium by appropriately expanding the set of parameters. This is essentially a
tautological statement, to point out that the issue of empirical implications of such models
is reduced to the more familiar question of identiﬁcation of the extended set of parameters.
Identiﬁcation is in fact possible if one is willing to postulate some restriction on the selection
mechanism operating over diﬀerent realizations of the data generating process (e.g., if the
parametrization of the equilibrium selection mechanism is independent of the number of
observations, the realizations of the data generating process). Often, natural restrictions
guarantee identiﬁcation of the model jointly with the parametrization of the selection.
In this paper we consider a general set-up which allows data to be realized from one
or more of the feasible equilibria. We show that even if the parameters (including the
selection parameters) are identiﬁed, when there are multiple equilibria the estimation of the
structural parameters is in general a daunting computational task. The likelihood of the data
c a no n l yi nf a c tb ed e ﬁned conditionally on the equilibrium selection. To correctly compute
the likelihood, one has to be able to compute all of the equilibria that are consistent with a
given set of parameters. If this is possible, a “direct estimator” of the structural parameters
can be computed by maximizing the likelihood over both the set of equilibria and the set
of the structural parameters. However, except in the simplest models, the dimensionality
of the equilibrium set is not known ex-ante nor is it constant across the parameter space,
which makes this approach computationally very diﬃcult.
Therefore, we suggest an estimator that considers the “equilibrium” (more generally,
2a vector of variables that are suﬃcient statistics for the description of the equilibrium),
as an additional estimable parameter. We propose a two-step method that, in the ﬁrst
step, estimates the equilibrium together with the other structural parameters without using
to the equilibrium restrictions imposed by the model. Such equilibrium restrictions are
imposed in the second step, to recover the structural parameters that are consistent with
the equilibrium estimated in the ﬁrst step, which is now taken as given. This method is
computationally easier, given that it does not require the computation of all of the feasible
equilibria.
We show that the two-step estimator is consistent, but in ﬁnite sample is equivalent
to the direct estimator only under a set of suﬃcient conditions with are very restrictive.
Finally, we use Monte Carlo simulations to analyze small sample properties of the estimators
we propose.
2 Related Literature
In an early contribution Jovanovic (1989) focuses on general identiﬁcation conditions for
the estimation of models with multiple equilibria but does not discuss the technical aspects
of the estimation. Dagsvik-Jovanovic (1994) study economic ﬂuctuations in a model with
two equilibria (high and low economic activity); they postulate a stochastic (Markovian)
equilibrium selection process over time and estimate the parameters of such process with
time series data on economic activity. The adopted functional form speciﬁcation allows the
investigator to derive closed form solutions of the “inverse equilibrium map” (the mapping
from the set of equilibria to the set of parameters), which helps contructing the sample
likelihood. Such map is assumed to be a function.
Others (for example: Bresnahan and Reiss 1991, Tamer 2001) consider games of com-
plete information where the investigator only observe the action played by the agents,
whereas the parameters to be estimated aﬀect also the payoﬀs. Clearly, in this case the in-
verse equilibrium map cannot be a function (a continuum of parameter values is consistent
with the same equilibrium realization of the strategy proﬁle). However, it is possible to
3ﬁnd identiﬁcation conditions whenever multiplicity is associated only with a subset of the
feasible parameter values, but not with the entire set. In this case one can in some sense
exploit the multiplicity to recover identiﬁcation.
Brock and Durlauf (2001) consider models of social interaction and consider situations
where the data realization depends not only on the “selected equilibrium” but also on the
fundamental parameters of the model. They derive conditions for identiﬁcation which do
not rely on assuming a speciﬁc equilibrium selection device.
In other cases it is natural to assume that all the observations are generated at the same
equilibrium. Moro, 2001, studies a model of statistical discrimination across racial char-
acteristics in which multiple equilibria exists (high and low human capital investments by
racial group). The equilibrium map linking wages to individual characteristics is diﬀerent
across diﬀerent equilibria and hence the equilibrium selection can be identiﬁed oﬀ cross-
sectional data. Notice that in this case, only one realization of the equilibrium is observed
and identiﬁcation is obtained by exploiting the properties of the equilibrium map. The
ability to identify and estimate models with multiple equilibrium in which only one realiza-
tion of the equilibrium is observed is an important innovation contributed by this paper:
Dagsvik-Jovanovic, for instance, can observe several equilibrium realization only because
they study a static model (repeated over time); had they modelled a dynamic economy
(e.g., had they modelled capital accumulation) they would have found themselves with a
single equilibrium realization.
[...to be continued...]
3T h e S e t u p
Consider an economy populated by a ﬁnite set of agents indexed by i ∈ I. Each agent i is
endowed with preferences represented by the utility function
Ui ¡
xi,x−i;θ0,u 0¢
4where xi represents a vector of unspeciﬁed arguments of utility in a general compact set X,
the index −i denotes the set of all agents except i,a n dx−i stacks all vectors xj for j 6= i;
also θ0 denotes a vector of preference parameters and u0 a random vector. Note that the
speciﬁcation of preferences allows for strategic interactions across agents.
Each agent i ∈ I chooses xi to maximize his utility given x−i and a vector of endogenous
variables p deﬁn e di nac o m p a c ts e tP, which appears in the constraint set, Xi(p,x−i;θ00,u 00);
where θ00 denotes a vector of parameters, and u00 a random vector. We let θ ≡ [θ0,θ00]d e ﬁned











is smooth in all the arguments, and strictly concave in xi;
Xi(p,x−i;θ00,u00) deﬁnes a convex valued continuous correspondence mapping (p,x−i,u00)
into X.
From Assumption 1 and Berge’s maximum theorem, it follows that the solution of
problem (1) is represented by a continuous function mapping (p,x−i)i n t oxi,w h i c hw e
write
xi = xi ¡
p,x−i;θ,u
¢
Let x(p,x;θ,u) denote the composition mapping, from xi = xi ¡
p,x−i;θ,u
¢
,o v e ri.L e tF
denote a vector valued mapping deﬁned on π ≡ (p,x).
Assumption 2 The mapping F is smooth in all its arguments.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium of the economy is a vector π ≡ (p,x) such that





Figure 1: A model without global identiﬁcation
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, with some extra regularity and dimensionality assumptions,
the equilibrium can be represented in general as a map from (θ,u)i n t oπ which has the
property of a smooth manifold.
Let π(θ,u) be such a map. Assumptions guaranteeing that π(θ,u)i so n e - t o - o n ea n d
deﬁned for all θ ∈ Θ are extremely restrictive, and frequently not satisﬁed in economic
models (see Figure 1 for a manifold which does not satisfy either of these properties) .
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, and some extra regularity and dimensionality assumptions,
the equilibrium can also be represented in general as a map from (π,u)i n t oθ, which also
has the property of a smooth manifold. Moreover, we assume the following.
Assumption 3 θ(π,u) is single valued, for π in a subset (possibly strict) of its domain
P × X, and not deﬁned everywhere else.
In other words, for any vector π and any u, either one and only one parameter θ exists
such that π is an equilibrium, or none. This assumption is essentially a (global) identiﬁcation
condition,1 and is required even if the economy does not display multiple equilibria. In
Figure 2 we show a manifold π(θ,u) which in not one-to-one (as an equilibrium manifold
it displays multiple equilibria), but is such that the associated manifold θ(π,u)i ss i n g l e
valued, and hence satisﬁes Assumption 3).





Figure 2: A model with multiple equilibria and global identiﬁcation
4O b s e r v a t i o n s
Let y ∈ Y denote a vector of observable variables. We assume there exists a map g from
the equilibrium variables π, parameters θ and random vector v into y. The random vector v
is a vector of disturbances drawn from distribution h(v)a ﬀecting the observations but not
the equilibrium (for example, observation errors).
Assumption 4 Fix θ ∈ Θ and a realization v;t h em a pg(π,θ;v) is smooth, one-to-one,
a n do n t oi nπ.
5 Maximum Likelihood Estimator
In general, the likelihood function of θ for the random variable y is deﬁned as
L(y|θ) ≡ p(y;θ)
where p(·) is the p.d.f. of y. In our setup, given the possible presence of multiple equilibria,
the likelihood L(y|θ) is in general a correspondence, and often quite complex to compute.







denotes the Aumann integral2 and π(θ,u)s a t i s ﬁes the equilibrium condition
(2). Loosely speaking, the Riemann integral is not deﬁned since π(θ,u) is in general a
correspondence; the Aumann integral is deﬁned for correspondences and is constructed by
taking the union of the Riemann integrals of all measurable selections of the correspondence;
it coincides with the Riemann integral when applied to a measurable function.
Let L(·,θ) be the set of probability distributions over the realization of y given θ deﬁned
by (3). Then, in our setup, generalizing the standard deﬁnition of identiﬁcation we have
that the parameter vector θ0 is identiﬁed if for all θ ∈ Θ, θ 6= θ0, ∀ l ∈ L(·|θ0),l/ ∈ L(·|θ1).
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 3 and 4, θ is in identiﬁed
5.1 A direct method
Suppose one observes a random sample y ≡ (y1,...,y N). The sample likelihood function







The direct estimator of θ can then be deﬁned as follows:
b θ =a r gm a x
θ
L(y|θ). (4)
Because of the possible multiplicity of equilibria, L(y|θ)i sv e r yd i ﬃcult to characterize,
as the maximum must be taken over the parameter space jointly with all the admissible
integrable selections of the correspondence L(y|θ). However not all integrable selections
need to be considered; in particular for each realization of the parameter vector, only the
equilibrium that maximizes the likelihood (over the set of feasible equilibria) should be
considered.
Deﬁne L(y|π,θ,u) the likelihood conditional on equilibrium π being realized when the




   
   
h(v)
if F (p,x(p,x;θ,u)) = 0
where v satisﬁes g(π,θ;v)=y
0o t h e r w i s e
(5)
Formally, (4) is equivalent to:












where v satisﬁes y = g(π,θ,v).
Proposition 3 The direct estimator b θ is consistent and eﬃcient.





(If F(π,θ,u) = 0 is never satisﬁed then L(y|πj,θ,u)=0 ) . Notice that Lj(θ)i sw e l ld e ﬁned
likelihood since we are conditioning on π so we have a well deﬁned probability distribution
over y.If we knew the equilibrium, say π0, we could maximize L(θ;π0) to obtain an estimator
ˆ θ(π0). With typical regularity conditions this estimator is consistent, asymptotically normal
and eﬃcient. Now deﬁne the following estimator:




Since asymptotically we choose ˆ θMLE = ˆ θ(π0) with probability one, then ˆ θMLE inherits its
properties. Finally, note that









L(y|πj,θ,u)f(u)du = ˆ θ
3We thank Victor Aguirregabiria for suggesting this proof strategy.
9The estimator in (6) requires, for each (θ,u), to compute all of the feasible equilibria,
compute their likelihood, choose the maximum, integrate over u and maximize over θ. Such
procedure is computationally diﬃcult to implement especially when the number of equilibria
is not known. because it may miss one or more equilibria. This is particularly relevant in
the situations when the parametric form of F(π;θ,u) does not allow the investigator to
know in advance how many solutions the equilibrium correspondence displays.
5.2 A Two-Step method
We now introduce a two-step estimation procedure. The ﬁrst step consists in computing
an estimator that ignores the equilibrium restriction from (2) in (5) and considers π as an





where v satisﬁes g(π,θ;v)=y
The ﬁrst step solves:
(b π1,b θ1) = argmax
π,θ
L(Y |π,θ)( 8 )
It is important to notice that the equilibrium restriction π = π(θ,u)i sn o ti m p o s e da n d
both π and θ are treated as free parameters.
In the second step, one re-estimates θ taking π = b π1 as given, but imposing the equilib-
rium restriction, to take into account the equilibrium conditions:











Note that the right hand side in (9) is the same as in (6) once the ﬁrst-step estimated





restrictions by construction, but the estimation does not require the computation of all the
equilibria, as π = b π, is taken as given, and θ(π,u) is well-behaved by Assumption 3.
105.3 Equivalence Between Estimators
We can then prove the following proposition describing two alternative sets of suﬃcient
conditions for equivalence to hold.
Proposition 4 Suﬃcient conditions for equivalence of the two-step and the direct estima-
tion of π procedures are either of the following:
1. for any (π,θ) there exists a unique u such that π = π(θ,u); moreover, u ∼ uniform
2. θ(π,u) is independent of u and takes a (unique by Assumption 3) value for any π
Proof. Condition 1) states that there is always a u such that π is an equilibrium given
parameters θ. But then if u is uniform f(u) is a constant, therefore the second step is
redundant and any maximizer of (8) is also a maximizer of (6).
Conditions 2) state that the realization of the data depend only on π, not on θ. Hence
in the ﬁrst step only π is identiﬁed. The second condition states that the model is non-
stochastic, and that the mapping from π to θ is a function. Hence, after having estimated
π in the ﬁrst step, it is possible to uniquely recover an estimate of π in the second step
Moro (2001) is the ﬁrst to employ the 2-step procedure to estimate a model with multiple
equilibria. In his model condition 2 holds and therefore the equivalence of the two procedures
follows readily.
It is interesting to consider a relaxation of condition 2). Suppose θ(π,u) is independent
of u, but, in accordance with Assumption 3, it takes a unique value π for π in a subset
(possibly strict) of its domain P × X, and is not deﬁned everywhere else. In this case
equivalence does not hold, but the two step procedure can be easily modiﬁed to guarantee










h(v)f(u)du such that θ = θ(π)
115.4 Consistency of the Two-Step Estimator
We can now discuss the asymptotic properties of each of the two-step estimator outlined
above.
Proposition 5 The two-step estimator of (π,θ) is consistent if
1) L(Y |π,θ) has a unique maximum in (π,θ);
the estimator of π is consistent if
2) L(Y |π,θ) has a unique maximum in π which is independent of θ.
Note that in the second case, consistency for θ is meaningless, as by construction we
only observe one realization of π w h i c hw ec a nu s et oe s t i m a t eθ. In the next section we
will study economies in which multiple realization of π are observed and hence the issue of
consistency of our estimator for θ can and will be addressed.
[...to be continued...]
6 Multiple Realized Equilibria
In the analysis so far, we have implicitly assumed that, while there are multiple equilibria,
as i n g l erealized equilibrium holds for the entire economy. In general, however, we may be
interested in situations in which diﬀerent units within the economy may ﬁnd themselves in
diﬀerent equilibria. Think, for example, of a set of segmented markets within the economy.
While the fundamental parameters are the same, in each market a diﬀerent equilibrium is
potentially selected. Suppose there are N markets in the economy, which can ﬁnd themselves










One complication is that we do not know ex-ante how many distinct equilibria there
are. Allowing markets to be in diﬀerent equilibria, we can repeat the estimation procedures
deﬁned above (both the direct and the 2-step method) and use (5) or (7) to deﬁne each
market’s contribution to the joint likelihood. Notice that the existence of multiple mar-
12kets at potentially diﬀerent equilibria provides additional identiﬁcation of the fundamental
parameters vector θ.
More interesting is the case where the equilibria are correlated across markets. For
example, one can think of a situation where neighboring cities are more likely to be at the
same equilibrium than distant cities. In a dynamic environment modeled as a repeated
static model, one can assume correlation between selected equilibria over time. In this
case, the parameters deﬁned by the correlation have to be jointly estimated with the other
fundamentals.
[...to be continued...]
7E x a m p l e s
We now apply the estimation procedure to three example adapted from existing literature.
The ﬁrst is a version of a generic model of global interaction from Brock and Durlauf (2001).
7.1 A Global Interaction model
Consider a world in which there are N cities, I agents per city. Agents are characterized
by a scalar characteristic Xi, observed by the econometrician. Cities are characterized by a
shock u n, unobserved to the econometrician. Agents choose an outcome yi ∈ {−1,1}.W e
assuming that the individual’s payoﬀ depends on her expectation about the choice of the
other agents Ei(y−i) within each city. The individual choice yi is the solution to
max
yi
V (yi,X i,u n,E i(y−i),εi(yi)),
where εi are individual errors shocks.
We specialize the model ﬁrst by assuming that the εi are extreme value distributed
which implies that the diﬀerence εi(−1) − εi(1) is logistically distributed:
Pr(εi(−1) − εi(1) ≤ z)=
1
1+e x p ( −βz)
;
13Secondly, we assume that payoﬀ can be additively decomposed into three terms:




with a linear speciﬁcation for h(Xi,u n):
h(Xi,u n)=k + cXi + un.
Finally, we assume that the agents interaction depends only on average behavior within
each city i.e. Jij = J
I , Then, (??) becomes
V (yi,X i,u n,εi(yi)) = (k + cXi + un) · yi + Jyiπn + εi(yi), (10)
where π n = E(yn), the expectation of the average action in city n. Assuming rational
expectations, the expected value of each individual choice is constrained by self-consistency
conditions which imply that the equilibrium average choice π n in city n is determined by
πn =
Z
tanh(k + cX + un + Jπn)dF(X). (11)
Solutions to (11) correspond to city-wide equilibria. It can be shown that for the equilibrium
is unique if J<1, otherwise if J>1 there are three distinct equilibria.
7.1.1 Estimation
The probability that agent i makes choice yi is equal to the probability that the utility of
yi is greater than the utility of −yi:
Pr(yi|Xi,u n,πn)=P r ( V (yi,X i,u n,εi(yi)) >V(−yi,X i,u n,εi(−yi))) =
Pr

 (k + cXi + un) · yi + Jyiπn + εi(yi) >
−(k + cXi + un) · yi − Jyiπn + εi(−yi)

.
One can show that the logistic speciﬁcation of the errors implies that
Pr(yi =1 |Xi,u n,πn) ∼ exp((k + cXi + un) · yi + Jyiπn).
14(obviously Pr(yi = −1|Xi,u n,πn)=1− Pr(yi =1 |Xi,u n,πn). Since the random utility





Pr(yi|Xi,u n,πn) ∼ (12)
Y
i
exp((k + cXi + un) · yi + Jyiπn).
Equation (12) suggests the following formulation of the likelihood function as a function of




[Pr(yi =1 |Xi,u n,πn)]
1+yi





[exp(k + cXi + un + Jπn)]
1+yi




If an estimator satisfying the equilibrium condition is important for the analyst, a brute
force approach consists in using (5) and estimate
















Such an estimator is computationally very expensive: for each θ,u , all equilibria πn con-
sistent with θ and u have to be computed.
A Naive Estimator
Brock and Durlauf (2001) consider π n as known and suggest a “naive” estimator of
the fundamental parameters vector {k,c,J} based on the maximization of the likelihood
deﬁn e di n( 1 3 ) :







15. While the estimator is consistent, nothing guarantees that with a ﬁnite sample the solution
satisﬁes the equilibrium restriction (11) for a particular value of π n. This correspond to
the ﬁrst step of our two-step method
The 2-step Method
To guarantee that the equilibrium restrictions are satisﬁed, we consider, in the ﬁrst
step, the estimation of the equilibrium {d πn1}k
n=1 in each city as a by-product of the naive
estimator:
{d πn1}k








and then, in the second step, impose the equilibrium restriction:









Notice that the restriction under the integrand is “easy” to compute since for each parameter
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